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Abstract 
 
Protecting information assets is very vital to the core survival of an organization. By increasing in cyber-
attacks and viruses worldwide, it has become essential for organizations to adopt innovative and rigorous 
procedures to keep these vital assets out of the reach of exploiters. Although worldwide complying with an 
international information security standard such as ISO 27001 has been raised, with over 7000 registered 
certificates, few Iranian companies are under ISO 27001 certified. Also organization needs to perform a 
risk assessment in order to determine the organization's asset exposure to risk and determine the best way 
to manage this. The determination of risk within the methodology is based upon the standard formula, which 
the risk is calculated from the multiplication of the asset value, threats and vulnerability. The ISO 27001 
requires is that 'An appropriate risk assessment shall be undertaken'. One of the main factors for risk 
assessment is identifying and scoring of Information asset in this process. Due to different values of asset 
in organizations, the main purpose of this study is to identify and investigate a weighted method to assign 
different values of assets in order to minimize vulnerability in manufacturing systems. This study also aims 
at improving asset value scoring by using heuristic methods. A real world case study was selected for 
implementation of this approach based on ISO27001` in Iran. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Information system security plays a significant role in most 
organizations and it can impose an extra cost to the organizations. 
Based on the investigations in 2010 in 738 organization loses 190$ 
million caused by information security violations[1,2]. In addition, 
recent literature has shown important costs relevant to information 
system security violation[3,4,5,1]. The organization tries to adopt 
innovative and rigorous procedures and methods to keep the 
information secure and out of the reach of exploiters. In recent 
years, the security risk analysis for information systems has 
attracted much attention of researchers in the field[6,7,8]. 
  Security risk analysis is an integrated part of enterprise risk 
management (ERM) that concentrate on analyzing threats and 
vulnerabilities to the information resources. However, security risk 
analysis is very critical and difficult task because of the dynamic 
and complicate the environment. Risk analysis can be grouped to 
basic categories: the quantitative approaches, qualitative 
approaches, and combination. 
  In the quantitative methods the mathematical and statistical 
analysis is used to show the risks[8]. Gordon and Loeb[9] developed 
a mathematical model to obtain the optimum security investment 
level for information systems. Following that Yue et al.[10] 
Extended their work of formulating and solving the problem based 
on a risk management paradigm. According to his work additional 
insight was provided into making an optimum decision by 
managers. Wu et al.[11] suggested a quantitative technique to 
determine the most important risk for conducting concurrent 
engineering projects. Moreover, risk-based method was proposed 
by [12] that make the trees as parametric constraints that authorized 
to determine probability quantity of security breaches that occurred 
because of the internal vulnerabilities. 
  Moreover, there are some qualitative methods to analyze the 
security risk such as Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) technique that help to define 
s set of assessment criteria to set up a common basis for finding the 
impact values because of threats to the important assets [13]. 
Practical Application of Risk Analysis (PARA) method was 
proposed by Peltier[14] to assess the systematic evaluation of 
tangible and intangible risks to provide cost effective measures to 
decrease risk to an acceptable level. 
  Additionally, there are other qualitative approaches such as 
CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) are 
created by the UK Government’s Central Computer and 
Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) and INFOSEC Assessment 
Methodology (IAM)[15]. 
88                                                             Ghasem Rezaei et al. / Jurnal Teknologi (Sciences & Engineering) 69:3 (2014), 87–91 
 
 
69:3 (2014) 37–44 | www.jurnalteknologi.utm.my | eISSN 2180–3722 | 
 
Some extensive methods combining both qualitative and 
quantitative methods have been suggested[15,16]. A similarity value 
of generalized fuzzy numbers was applied by Chen et al.[17] to solve 
the fuzzy risk analysis difficulties. This method was unable to show 
the graphical relationships between different security risk 
parameters applying flow charts or diagrams. Therefore, to deal 
with this problem Fan and Yu [18] suggested a Bayesian networks 
(BNs) based procedure. In their method, the BN is organized solely 
based on domain experts’ experience. 
  One evidential reasoning approach under the Dempster–
Shafer theory to analyze the risk of information system security 
was proposed by Sun et al[1] to connect relevant security risk 
parameters, related countermeasures, and their interrelationships. 
After that sensitivity analysis was done to assess the effect of 
important factors on the model’s results. It should be noted that the 
models that are conducted incorrectly or proposed based on 
questionable assumptions are vulnerable to model risks[19]. 
  The goal of this paper is to propose a new quantitative and 
qualitative approach for finding the information asset value. This 
study introduced three hierarchical steps for finding the value of 
information assets. These steps are: identify information assets, 
securing of information assets based on each sub-dimensions, 
identify the final value of information assets based on the sum of 
all obtained scoring from sub-demotions. 
 
 
2.0  METHODOLOGY 
 
In this paper, we propose a new quantitative and qualitative 
approach for obtaining the information asset value. This study 
introduced three hierarchical steps for determining the value of 
information assets. These steps are: identify information assets, 
scoring of information assets based on each sub-demotions, 
identify the final value of information assets based on the sum of 
all obtained scoring from sub-demotions. 
  In the first step the information assets should be identified. In 
this identification, all information assets are listed. Next, all assets 
based on their specification like owner, users of asset and asset 
location are listed in detail. To classify information assets, we apply  
British BS7799 standard[20]:  
 
• Information Asset: database, data file, system document, user 
management, plan document, provision for alternative system 
• Documents: contracts, guidelines, company documents, 
important business documents 
• Software Asset: applications S/W, system S/W, development 
tool and utility 
• Physical Asset: computer and communication magnetic disk, 
power supply, air conditioning, furniture, facilities 
• Personnel Asset: individuals, customer, subscriber 
• Image and Reputation of a Company 
• Service: computer and communication service, warm, light, air 
conditioning. 
 
  The next step is to identify asset value based on sub 
dimension. The minimum scale of each sub dimension is zero and 
maximum one is three (Table 2). The definition of each sub 
dimension is listed in this table. The value of each asset can be 
defined as the sum of the nine sub dimensions score for each asset. 
The scoring method for assets is described in Table 3. It should be 
noted that for each assets the value between 1-3 has been allocated 
based on expert opinion. For example, consider the Table 3 
definition and a PC as one of information assets. To assign scores 
for this PC, based on its price, it can obtain score’s value of 1, 2 or 
3 in financial effect sub-demotions. For all sub-demotions value 
assignments for assets has been discussed in Table 3 as well.   
  Non relevant criteria for assets take zero value as their score. 
The value of each asset can be determined using the sum of the nine 
dimensions. 
  Finally, value score for each asset calculate by the sum of all 
obtained score from sub-demotions. 
 
Table 1  Enterprise assets considered by different reference 
Assets main groups 
Tangible (Examples) Intangible 
Information: (Policy document) Goodwill 
Information: (Data files) 
Service to 
clients 
IT services: (Messaging-active directory) 
Public 
confidence 
Software: System (Solaris), Application (Oracle), Public trust 
Utilities (management tools) 
Competitive 
advantage 
Hardware: Hosts (Servers) other (Printers) 
Imageof the 
organization 
Communication: Network (Routers), (Cable) Reputation 
O Documents: (Management commitment) 
Trust in 
services 
Agreements: (Confidentiality-third party) 
Employee 
morale 
Information: (Research)  Productivity 
Other: (User manuals-training material)  Loyalty 
P IT staff: (IT security manager)  Ethics 
Employee: (Senior management)  
Users: (Inside/Outside)  
Contractors:(Consultants)  
Owners:(Stakeholders)  
E Services: (Heating-lighting-power-AC)  
Equipment: (Desks-Fax machines-Cables)  
Physical (infrastructure): (Offices-facilities)  
 
 
3.0  CASE STUDY 
 
In this study, a cement plant manufacturer in IRAN was selected as 
a case study. This company adopted to ISO/IEC 27001(ISMS) [21] 
to obtain competitive advantage. The objectives were to enhance 
the risk profile, information systems quality, businesses continuity 
and brand image. The ISMS scope of this company is all of the 
assets in a factory and his office in another city. It integrated 
information security management in its existing integrated 
management system based on ISO 9001, ISO 14001, Ohsas 18001 
(occupational health and safety management) and 10002. These 
standards share the same general requirements, document structure, 
and management principles such as the ‘Plan-Do-Check-Act’-
cycle. Consultants supported implementation, carried out risk 
assessments and drafted policy documents. Implementation has had 
a positive impact on the availability of IT systems, service quality, 
business continuity and customer satisfaction. 
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In our selected case study, more than 2400 assets have been 
identified. Six assets were selected as a sample for implementing 
our method which shows in Table 4. The Table 4 shows scaling of 
the six information asset of the company that has been selected as 
the sample. 
  Table 4 investigates different information assets and classify 
them based on various aspects. All assets identified by exclusive 
code. After coding step, attributes including type, specification, 
user in charge and location assign to assets. Regarding to stratigcal, 
operational and structural dimensions, each asset takes a score 
ranging from 1 up to 27 based on Table 3. It should be noted, all 
scores assignment was done by experts point of view. Finally total 
score for each asset is calculated by summing of all obtained score. 
Table 5 shows the significance of different assets based on their 
obtained score. 
 
Table 4  Scoring table 
 
1 ≤ Score ≤ 9 Low Value 
9 ≤ Score ≤ 18 Valuable 
   19 ≤ Score ≤ 27 High Value 
 
 
4.0  CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we tried to shed an innovative method for scaling 
Information assets in the manufacturing organizations after the 
identifying of the organization's assets throughout the planning 
phases of the ISO 27001 certification process. This method was 
used for an Iranian company during the implementation of ISO 
27001. When it came to motivations, enhancing the organization's 
security level and obtaining competitive advantages. The research 
shows how to calculate the asset value by combining the nine sub 
dimension. In summary, it is clear that asset assessment is the 
cornerstone of Risk Assessment.  
  To achieve asset value in the Manufacturing organizations, 
essential steps are needed. These steps are: 1- identify its assets, 2- 
identifying the value of the each asset base on three dimension 
(Structural dimension, operational dimension and Strategic 
dimension) and nine sub dimension (Financial impact, The 
sensitivity of the company's vision, Functional dependence, 
Authenticity and integrity, Availability, Authenticity and integrity, 
Legal effect, Competitive effect, Connection with the company's 
strategic goals), and 3- The value of each asset can be defined using 
the sum of the nine dimension. This paper proposes a new asset 
scaling method. A case study is investigated for the validation of 
the usefulness of this method. It contributes an effective method for 
scaling the information system assets such as server, application, 
and data in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
  In the present context of competitive environment, it is 
recommended that the Innovative method for Scaling of 
Information Assets in the Manufacturing organizations in this study 
should serve as a guiding for the manufacturing and IT manager 
when implementing ISO 27001 in their companies. The innovative 
risk assessment method that used in this case study will be reported 
in a future article. 
 
Table 2  Definition of dimension and sub-dimension  or valuation of assets 
 
Definition Sub-dimension Dimension 
To what extent losing, damaging or disclosing of  assets can bring loss for company. Note: 
only financial effects are considerable. (E.g. if a computer server faces in trouble, how 
much does it cost for replacement not the cost of recovery of lost data 
Financial Effect 
Structural 
Dimension 
To the extent the assets are emphasized by top managers 
The Sensitivity Of 
The Managers’ 
Vision 
To what extent losing, damaging or disclosing of assets can bring a problem for internal 
processes, operations, and core business processes 
Functional 
Dependency 
Operational 
Dimension 
To what extent assets are confidential from managers’ perceptions Confidentiality 
To what extent availability of the asset is important for users Availability 
To what extent losing, damaging or disclosing of assets can reduce the integrity of 
information in the scope 
Integrity 
To what extent losing, damaging or disclosing of assets cause legal problems. Legal Effect 
Strategic 
Dimension 
To what extent the assets of the company are treated as the competitive element Competitive Effect 
To what extent losing, damaging or disclosing of assets can endanger company to achieve 
the strategic goals 
Connection with 
Strategic Goals Of 
Company 
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Table 3  Asset scaling method 
 
Sub-dimension 
Scaling Method 
(1 )Low (2) Medium (3) High 
 
Financial Effect 
 
Less than twenty million Rials 
Between twenty to two hundred million 
Rials 
Over than two hundred million Rials 
The Sensitivity 
Of The 
Managers’ 
Vision 
There is not any relevant 
suggestions for the assets 
Occasionally, reminding manager's attention 
towards assets is needful 
Constantly, Occasionally, reminding 
manager's attention towards assets is 
required 
Functional 
Dependency 
Without these assets, the main 
operation of the Company cannot 
be stopped or   the resulting delay 
and resulting stop are tolerable 
Without these assets, a number of operations 
have to be stopped and delayed. Tolerance is 
intermediate 
Without these assets, the main operation 
of Company seriously cause to  damage, 
stop and delay,   that the company will not 
tolerate 
Confidentiality  
Related assets from the company's 
vision is not confidential, but there are some 
considerations 
Related assets from the Chief’s point 
of view is entirely confidential 
Availability 
Unavailability of relevant 
assets does not have a lot of stops 
and delay in the works and the 
stop delay is tolerable. 
Unavailability of relevant assets cause 
to stop and delay in the works and tolerance 
is intermediate 
Unavailability of relevant assets cause 
serious stop and delay in works which are 
not tolerable 
Integrity 
Improper functioning of the 
relevant assets has little effect on 
the accuracy and integrity of 
information 
Improper functioning of the relevant 
assets to the extent the accuracy and 
integrity of information affect or could affect 
Improper functioning of the relevant 
assets has serious effect on the accuracy 
and integrity of information 
Legal Effect Assets have low legal effect 
The loss of or damage to assets may result in 
legal suits against the company 
The loss or damage to assets certainly 
results in legal suits against the company 
Competitive 
Effect 
The relevant assets are not an 
effective competitive factors or  
the other competitors have the 
relevant assets 
Competitors do not have the relevant assets 
and currently achieving the assets are not 
important but in the future might be treated 
as the important factor ( in future the assets 
might be distinct) 
Competitors do not have the assets that are 
important to them or having this asset 
cause a competitive advantage for the 
company (This asset cause to distinct 
company unlike the others) 
Connection 
With Strategic 
Goals Of 
Company 
The relevant assets do not have a 
key role in achieving the strategic 
goals of the company 
The relevant assets do not have not a key 
role in achieving the strategic goals but 
Indirectly affect the achievement of strategic 
goals of the company 
The relevant assets do not have a key role 
in achieving the  strategic goals the 
company or without this achieving 
strategic goals might be difficult 
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Table 5  Results analysis 
 
Total 
Scale 
Structural 
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7 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Quality 
Assurance Room 
Quality 
Assurance 
Expert 
PC Computer 
1 
 
7 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 
Production 
statist room 
Production 
Statist 
PC Computer 2 
19 3 2 3 2 3 3 0 1 2 Server Room 
Computer 
Expert 
ISA 
Server(Wireless) 
Computer 3 
10 1 2 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 Server Room Computer expert Novell Server Computer 4 
7 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 Sales Sale Employee PC Computer 5 
12 2 1 2 0 3 3 0 0 1 
Enclosure 
Company 
IT manager Cate 5E Cable 6 
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